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Nevada v. Inzunza, 135 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 (Dec. 26, 2019)1 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SIXTH AMENDMENT 
Summary  
 
 The Court affirmed a pretrial motion to dismiss of an indictment after it determined that 
the State failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice after an analysis under the Barker-Doggett 
factors.2 The Court afforded “the only possible remedy” after it was found that a 26 month delay 
resulted from the State’s gross negligence and the delay was prejudicial to Inzunza.  
 
Background 
 
 Rigoberto Inzunza lived in the same household as E.J when she was nine years old. 
Inzunza allegedly sexually assaulted E.J. over the course of a year until he moved out of the 
residence.  Six years later, E.J. informed her therapist of the assaults. The therapist informed 
E.J.’s mother who subsequently went with E.J. to file a police report at the North Las Vegas 
Police Department (NLVPD). The NVLPD interviewed E.J. and opened an investigation. E.J.’s 
mother provided detective Hoyt with printouts from Inzunza’s Facebook profile depicting his 
car, New Jersey license plate, and his employer’s business name and number. Hoyt submitted the 
case to the District Attorney’s office to file charges after only trying to locate Inzunza locally. 
 
 One month after E.J. reported the sexual assault, the State filed a criminal complaint 
charging Inzunza with 10 counts of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age in addition to 
five counts of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age. The NVLPD then entered the warrant 
into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) without informing detective Hoyt, pursuant 
to NLVPD policy. Hoyt made no further effort to follow up in the case. Inzunza was arrested in 
New Jersey two years later on January 29, 2017 for the outstanding warrant and was transported 
to Nevada. The State then obtained an indictment, adding another count of sexual assault.  
 
 Inzunza moved to dismiss the case, arguing the State violated his Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial and his due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due to the 
two-year delay between his charge and arrest.3 The State conceded that it was aware Inzunza was 
in New Jersey but it could not move forward by contacting the New Jersey police before it 
obtained a warrant for arrest. Further, the State explained that their policy does not alert any 
detectives upon an issuing of a warrant. Therefore, it was an error on the part of NLVPD for 
failing to check if the warrant was approved and following up with their information. 
  
 Detective Hoyt explained that he relied on the DA’s office to file the charges, return the 
case to NLVPD to get a warrant, and enter the warrant into the NCIC database. In addition, he 
stated that he “hope[d]” that utilizing the NCIC would work to apprehend Inzunza. Hoyt further 
explained that their policy did not encourage them to follow up on cases submitted to the DA’s 
office, call other jurisdictions without a warrant, or follow up on Facebook leads. Additionally, it 
was stated that it was not customary to utilize police resources in tracking down an individual in 
a “common sexual assault” case.  
 
1  By Christopher Gonzalez. 
2  See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972); Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 651–54 (1992). 
3  U.S. Const. amend. VI 
Discussion 
 
The Court reviewed the district court’s decision to grant or deny a motion to dismiss an 
indictment based on a speedy trial violation for an abuse of discretion.4 In evaluation of a Sixth 
Amendment right violation, the Court gives deference to the district court’s factual findings and 
reviews them for clear error.5 However, the court’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.6  
 
 The Sixth Amendment guarantees “[in] all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right to a speedy… trial.”7 Such violations are analyzed by applying a four-part balancing test 
set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Barker and clarified in Doggett.8 The four parts 
of the test include length of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, 
and prejudice to the defendant.9 The Court stated that each case must be decided on its own facts 
and that “[n]o one factor is determinative.”10 
 
 When considering the length of delay, the Court considers two factors. First, to trigger 
the Barker-Doggett analysis, the length of delay must be presumptively prejudicial and found 
that accusations meet the required standard “as it approaches one year.”11 Second, when the test 
is triggered, the district court must consider, “as one factor among several, the extent to which 
the delay stretches beyond the bare minimum needed to trigger judicial examination.”12  
 
 The Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the length 
of Inzunza’s 26-month delay triggered the Barker-Doggett test as it was long enough for it to be 
classified as presumptively prejudicial. The Court also explained that the State ignores a strong 
of cases allowing a Barker-Doggett analysis for significantly shorter delays than in Doggett.13 
 
 When considering the reason for delay, the Court stated that this factor focuses on 
whether the government is responsible for the delay and is the “focal inquiry” in a speedy trial 
challenge.14 Doggett stated that the district court’s finding on the reason for delay and its 
justification is reviewed “with considerable deference” and Barker further outlined three types of 
government delay with an assigned weight to each instance.15 
 
4  See Hill v. State, 188 P.3d 51, 54 (2008) (reviewing for abuse of discretion a denial of motion to dismiss an 
indictment based on grand juror bias); State v. Craig, 484 P.2d 719 (1971) (reviewing for abuse of discretion based 
on a statutory speedy trial violation). 
5  See United States v. Gregory, 322 F.3d 1157, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2003). 
6  See United States v. Carpenter, 781 F.3d 599, 607–08 (1st Cir. 2015). 
7  U.S. Const. amend VI. 
8  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 651. 
9  Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.  
10  United States v. Clark, 83 F.3d 1350, 1354 (11th Cir. 1996) (each case must be decided on its own facts); United 
States v. Ferreira, 665 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 2011) (no one factor is determinative). 
11  See United States v. Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d 772, 776 (8th Cir. 2009) (Length of delay must be presumptively 
prejudicial); United States v. Corona-Verbera, 509 F.3d 1105,1114 (9th Cir. 2007) (Found a delay that approaches 
one year is presumptively prejudicial).  
12  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652. 
13  See, e.g., United States v. Moreno, 789 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2015); United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 185 (3d. 
Cir. 1998); United States v. Beamon, 992 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993). 
14  United States v. Alexander, 817 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2016). 
15  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 652; Barker, 407 U.S. at 531. 
 The Court concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion when it found the 26-
month delay was caused entirely by the State’s gross negligence finding Hoyt did not attempt to 
contact Inzunza or have him arrested despite knowing his whereabouts. Additionally, there was 
no evidence Inzunza was aware of the charges which could suggest he was evading the law. 
 
When considering the assertion of the right, the Court will next determine “whether in 
due course the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial.”16 While the State argued that this 
factor weighed against Inzunza because he did not assert this right, the Court declined this 
argument because a defendant must be aware that the State filed charges against them to have the 
factor weighed against them.17 Therefore, the Court found that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion when it found that the assertion of the right was not weighed against Inzunza.  
 
Lastly, when considering the prejudice to the defendant, the Court analyzed “the 
possibility that the defense will be impaired” finding it to be the only relevant interest 
(disregarding factors including “oppressive pretrial incarceration” and “anxiety and concern of 
the accused”).18 The Doggett court stated that the “[I]mpairment of one’s defense is the most 
difficult form of speedy trial prejudice to prove because time’s erosion of exculpatory evidence 
and testimony ‘can rarely be shown.”19 It was clarified that “courts should not be overly 
demanding with respect to proof of such prejudice.”20 The Court then reiterated that in Doggett, 
the Supreme Court found the prejudice factor of Barker may weigh in favor of the defendant 
even though they “failed to make any affirmative showing that the delay weakened his ability 
raise specific defenses, elicit specific testimony, or produce specific items of evidence.”21  
 
 Once the presumption of prejudice is applied, the State is afforded the opportunity to 
rebut the presumption. Upon the failure of such a rebuttal, the Barker factors weigh in favor of 
the defendant, necessitating the “severe remedy of dismissal” as the “only possible remedy.”22 
The Court explained the only instance where a defendant is relieved of showing actual prejudice 
is in cases which the delay is five years or more.23  
 
 The Court considered various factors including: the length of the post-charge delay, 
whether the length of the post-charge delay was compounded by a lengthy and inordinate pre-
charge delay, the investigation conducted by law enforcement, the complexity of the alleged 
crime, and whether the negligence was particularly egregious.24  
 
 The Court concluded that, even if the State and Hoyt were acting within policy, the 
investigation was negligent due to their inaction in light of overwhelming information provided 
by E.J.’s mother.25  Restating that Inzunza was not aware of the charges, it was determined that 
 
16  Erenas-Luna, 560 F.3d at 778. 
17  Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653–54. 
18  Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. 
19  Doggett, 404 U.S. at 555 (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 532). 
20  5 Wayne R LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 18.2(e) (14th ed. 2015). 
21  Doggett, 407 U.S. at 655. 
22  Barker, 407 U.S. at 522. 
23  United States v. Serna–Villarreal, 352 F.3d 225, 232 (5th Cir. 2003). 
24  United States v. Oliva, 909 F.3d 1292, 1302 (11th Cir. 2018) 
25  United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 987 (11th Cir. 1997). 
the state’s actions were the sole reason for the delay. With the burden shifted to the state to rebut 
the presumption of prejudice, the court found that it failed to meet its burden by no offering 
rebuttal evidence at the evidentiary hearing and did not address prejudice in its Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Lastly, the Court declined the state’s argument that Inzunza was 
not prejudiced because he was arrested during the statute of limitations period because it is 
meant to give the victim more time to come forward, not afford law enforcement more time to 
arrest the perpetrator. Thus, the Court found that the State has not persuasively rebutted the 
presumption of prejudice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 According to the Court, a Sixth Amendment violation is afforded the severe remedy of 
dismissal because it is the “only possible remedy.” The Court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal of the indictment after an analysis under the Barker–Doggett test finding Inzunza 
properly invoked his speedy trial, he was properly entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the 
State failed to rebut that presumption.  
